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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pl.aintif /-Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE WILLIAM JACKSON, 
Defendant-A pp ell.ant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11340 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
On January 5, 1968, the appellant was charged with 
the crime of murder in the first degree in connection with 
the shooting of one Willie Henry Watson on January 4, 
1968. The appellant was later bound over to the Third 
District Court to stand trial for the accused crime. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a four day trial which began on April 2, 1968, 
and concluded on April 6, 1968, the jury found the ap-
pellant guilty of murder in the second degree. This is an 
appeal from that conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower court's 
judgment and appellant's conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is in general agreement with the state-
ment of facts as contained in the appellant's brief with 
the following exceptions, additions and alterations: 
1. While appellant in his brief states he was the 
"sole economic contributor," the record presents quite a 
different picture in that the partners were jointly respons-
ible for the payment of money borrowed and fixtures pur-
chased which constituted major portions of the partnership 
property (Tr.275-276, 279, 310). 
2. It should be emphasized that while the appellant 
insists that he saw the deceased pull a gun (Tr.300-301, 
329-331), no gun was found (Tr.185, 223), nor was any 
explanation for its disappearance presented during the 
course of the trial. 
3. The testimonial evidence not only showed conclu-
sively "that the Defendant intended to inflict bodily harm," 
but that he in fact intended to kill. Mr. Banks asked the 
question, "And you wanted to be sure he was dead, didn't 
you?" And the appellant answered, "That's correct." (Tr. 
331). 
4. Appellant's statement as to what questions he con-
tends remained in the balance would have been more ap-
propriately contained in the body of his argument. 
5. While appellant contends in his brief that "four 
photographs of the deceased taken from various positions 
... were placed in evidence," i.t should be noted from the 
photographs themselves (State exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 8) that 
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only two positions were involved and that these exhibits 
were merely a black and white (Exhibits 2 and 8) and a 
colored slide (Exhibits 3 and 4) taken from each of these 
two positions. 
6. It cannot go without note that the appellant's pre-
sentation of the facts relating to the partnership should be 
weighed in light of the fact that his partner is no longer 
around to testify as to what might actually have been their 
relationship. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING INTO EVIDENCE CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
THE DECEASED TAKEN SHORTLY AFTER HIS 
DEATH. 
It is well recognized that the admissibility of photo-
graphs is a matter of judicial discretion and will not be 
disturbed unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
PeO'ple v. Shiers, 160 Cal. App.2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1968); 
Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951); 
Slate v. Poe, 21 U.2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968); State v. 
Renzo, 21 C.2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968). 
At the same time, the test normally applied to deter-
mine whether there has been an abuse of discretion is to 
weigh the probative value of the photographs against any 
probable prejudice to the defendant. State v. Poe, supra, 
State v. Renzo, swpra. The respondent submits that when 
this test is applied, it must be found that the photographs 
\'VTere probative of the issues. 
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A. Photographs were probative of the issues. 
It must be remembered that the State had the burden 
of proving appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the crime charged, that of first degree murder. To do so, 
it necessarily had to prove the elements of that crime, 
enumerated in Section 76-30-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
which in part provides: 
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in 
wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, mali-
cious and premeditated killing; or committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated 
from a premeditated design unlawfully and mali-
ciously to effect the death of any human being other 
than the one who is killed; or perpetrated by any 
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and 
evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human 
life; - is murder in the first degree. . .. 
Further, the entire entry of a plea of not guilty puts 
in issue every material allegation of the information. Utah 
Oode Ann. Section 77-24-4 (1953). 
Colored slides of the deceased were held prop-
erly admitted for their probative value in demon-
strating malice afterthought, and whether defendant 
had an abandoned and malignant heart at the time 
of the killing and there admissibility, was not an 
abuse of discretion even though they were gruesome. 
People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961). 
This Court in the Renzo case, supra, citing a Missouri 
case, had the following to say concerning this matter: 
In State v. Moore, 303 S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1957), 
the defendant was prosecuted for the murder of his 
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wife. He claimed that it was reversible error to ad-
mit four pictures of the deceased showing the wound 
... The State offered the exhibit on the theory that 
the location of the wound showed that defendant 
acted consciously and took accurate aim when firing 
the gun. The court said: 
The rule as to the admissibility of this sort of 
visual evidence is well settled. Demonstrative 
evidence of this character is admissible if it 
tends to connect the accused with the crime, or 
to prove the identify of the deceased, or show 
of nature of the wound, or throw any relevant 
light upon a material matter at issue. 
* * * 
Even if we assume that there was evidence 
upon all of the material facts shown by the 
photographs it does not follow that the exhibits 
were inadmissible. 
In answer to a defendant's contention that photos of the 
body of deceased should have been excluded, the court in 
People v. Toth, 6 Cal. Rprt. 372 (1960), replied: 
In the trial of a charge of murder in the second 
degree it is essential for the People to establish malice 
aforethought. Such malice may be shown by the 
extent and severity of the injuries inflicted upon the 
victim and by the condition in which the victim was 
left by the attacker. 
Such photos have also been held admissible: To show 
the condition of the body, or to indicate the nature or extent 
of wounds or injuries thereon, Reizenstien v. St.ate, 165 
Neb. 865, 87 N.W.2d 560 (1958), manner of death, location, 
severity, and number of wounds, State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 
552, 124 So. 2o 543 ( 1966), amount of force used, People 
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v. Kolep, 29 Ill. 1160, 193 N.E. 2d 753 (1963), and the sever-
ity and violence of the assault on the deceased, Common-
wealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150 (1963); the 
fact that such photos may be gruesome notwithstanding. 
A case very much in point is that of State v. Russell, 106 
Utah 116, 145 P.2d 1003 (1944) in which this Court said: 
. . . The pictures of the deceased, taken after her 
death and showing her wounds, were clearly ad-
missible. Even though the defendant did admit the 
killing, he did not admit the intent to kill and the 
nature of the wounds may be material on that point. 
The pictures showed the nature of the wounds more 
clearly than the testimony of witnesses could. . .. 
In a recent Idaho murder case, the defendant was 
charged with murdering a three year old child by kicking 
it to death. The court there held that the charge involved 
the element of malice with which the crime was committed 
and photographs showing the battered nude body of the de-
ceased helped to establish the malice. State v. Martinez, 92 
Idaho 183, 439 P.2d 691 (1968). 
The court, in rejecting defendant's claim that these 
photographs had no probative value and served only to 
arouse the passions of the jury, stated at 439 P.2d 696: 
The general rule is that photographs of the 
victim in a prosecution for homicide, duly verified 
and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful repre-
sentations of the victim at the time in question are, 
in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in evi-
dence as an aid to the jury in arriving at a fair un-
derstanding of the evidence, proof of the corpus 
delicti, extent of injury, condition and identification 
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of the body, or for their bearing on the question 
of the degree or atrociousness of the crime, even 
though such photographs may have the additional 
effect of tending to excite the emotions of the jury. 
(See generally 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 852 [1] 
[1961]; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence Secs. 785-788 and 
798 [1967]; 159 A.L.R. 1413 [ 1945]. 73 A.L.R.2d 769 
[1960]. See also State v. Kleier, 69 Idaho 278, 206 
P.2d 513 [1949].) 
The generalizations above referred to have been 
specifically applied with respect to homicide cases 
involving the admissibility into evidence of photo-
graphs for the designated purpose of determining 
the atrociousness or malice with which the crime 
was committed. 
The respondent submits that the photographs used were 
helpeful in assisting the jury in determining whether the 
requisite intent was present, a question upon which the ap-
pellant himself places much emphasis. It is also significant 
that State exhibits 3 and 8 were used only to depict the vic-
tim's position relative to the surrounding fixtures, and 
appear to have been taken from the probable position of the 
appellant at the time of the shooting. What could! be more 
probative than a picture of the deceased and his surround-
ings taken from the position and angle of the actual shoot-
ing? 
As the above cases also indicate, the location and num-
ber of the wounds along with the relative position of the 
victim after the slaying have particular probative value 
especially in the case of first degree murder. The position 
of the wounds and the accuracy with which the shots were 
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fired become increasingly probative where the defense of 
self defense is asserted as in the instant case. 
B. Photographs were not prejudicial to the defendant. 
Before dealing directly with the issue of the photos 
being "prejudicial," it would appear appropriate to answer 
appellant's repeated contention that the cause lay in a "pre-
carious balance" prior to the admission of the photographs 
in question, and that such admission violently upset that bal-
ance to the appellant's detriment. The respondent submits, 
and the evidence clearly indicates, that if any "precarious 
balance" existed, Lady Justice was tip-toeing the line be-
tween first and second degree murder and not between sec-
ond degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. If the re-
spondent might conjecture, it was probably but for the age 
of the appellant that he was not convicted of first degree 
murder. 
It is difficult to fully appreciate this "precarious bal-
ance" contention when the appellant also uses in his brief 
such phrases as " ... overwhelming case against the Defend-
ant ... " andi "With its case (the States) in such a strong 
position. . . ." 
While the appellant relies heavily on the Poe case in his 
claim of prejudicial error resulting from the admission of 
the photographs in question, the two cases are dissimilar in 
most respects. In the Poe case the photographs were taken 
after an autopsy had been performed on the victim. 
As a matter of fact, it would appear from Chief Justice 
Crockett's concurring opinion in the Renzo case that the 
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main reason for the Poe reversal was that the photographs 
were not depictive of the accused's actions. In reference 
to the Poe case, he said: 
But the prosecution went beyond any necessity 
of proof and introduced the offending colored slides 
relating to something quite separate and apart from 
the crime, and which the def end.ant had nothing to 
do with causing: the gory procedures of a patholo-
gist. (It should be notedi that Justice Callister, who 
wrote the majority opinion in the Poe case, concurred 
in this concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.) 
The probative value of the photographs for this and 
other reasons was highly questionable. Perhaps most signi-
ficant, as the verdict in the Poe case indicated, was that the 
defendant's life did in fact hang in the balance. It would 
appear from what Chief Justice Crockett further said in 
his concurring opinion in the Renzo case, that the verdict 
reached by the jury can itself be an index of the prejudicial 
affect of evidence. Speaking of the Poe case, he said: 
. . . This lack of probative purpose, coupled with 
the fact that there was a definite likelihood that 
they would have the affect of suggesting brutality 
in the crime, and thus provoking resentment and 
inflaming the passions of the jury against the ac-
cused, (which likelihood incidentally appears to have 
been borne out by the verdict), leads us to believe 
that it was prejudicial error to admit the pictures 
in the Poe case. 
After a thorough look at the facts and circumcstances 
of this case, can it be candidly said that the verdict of sec-
ond degree murder reached by the jury is in any way reflec-
tive of passioru or prejudice? The respondent submits that 
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the verdict in the instant case can in no way be construed 
to raise the implication that the jury was in any way preju-
diced against the appellant by way of the photographs ad-
mitted. On the contrary, and, as has been previously men-
tioned, it would appear that the jury afforded the 'appel-
lant every benefit of the doubt, even when the doubt may 
have appeared unreasonable. 
While the appellant repeatedly contends in his brief 
that the purpose of the photographs was to "arouse the jury 
to the point where they would infer malice, pre-meditation 
and deliberation on the part of th~ Defendant," it is appar-
ent, in view of the verdict, that pre-meditation and delibera-
tion, not being elements of second degree murder, need not 
have been found. The facts clearly establish malice. 
It is the respondent's contention that the probative value 
of the photographs far outweighed any possible prejudice 
against the appellant. It is submitted that the photographs 
do illustrate depravity, do give proof of pre-meditation and 
deliberation (close shot group or pattern), do prove or indi-
cate proof that deceased died as a result of the wounds 
(show he was shot four or five times in the head). It is 
further submitted that the verdict, when viewed in light of 
the facts presented at the trial, clearly indicates that the jury 
was in no way prejudiced against the appellant in their 
finding of second degree murder. 
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POINT II. 
FAIL URE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMITTANCE OF 
THE PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE TIME OF TRIAL IS 
FATAL TO THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. 
The validity of Point II of this argument must of neces-
sity be weighed in connection with Point I, for it would ap-
pear from Utah law that the leniency with which the ap-
pellate courts are to treat non-objections of counsel toques-
tionable evidence is directly proportional to the probable 
prejudicial affect of that same evidence. 
The respondent submits that by virtue of showing that 
the appellant was not prejudiced by the admittance of the 
photographs, his failure to object provides the second basis 
for his appeal to fail. 
It will be noted that the excerpted portion of State v. 
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), as cited in appellant's 
brief, contains the statement: 
... we think that when palpable error is ma.de to 
appear on the face of the record and to manifest 
prefudice of the accused, the Court has power to 
notice such error and to correct the same, though 
no formal exception was taken to the ruling. (Em-
phasis by respondent.) 
Can it be said that "palpable error is made to appear 
on the face of the record" in the instant case? In this case 
is it not more logical to give emphasis to the opening lines 
of the statement from which the above is takeru where the 
Court said: 
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We wish not to depatit from the rule laid down 
in this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on appeal 
errors relating to instructions or refusing requests 
to instruct wm not be considered or reviewed unless 
exceptions thereto were properly taken by the party 
complaining. 
While the above deals with the instructing of the jury, 
this Court has been even more forceful in expounding the 
rule as it applies to the admission of evidence. 
In State v. N e"UJon, 12 U.2d 177, 364 P.2d 409 ( 1961) 
the court said: 
We here note that we do not disagree with the 
contention that even in the absence of an objection 
this court might nevertheless take note of and cor-
rect an egregious error. But this could properly be 
done ·Only in an unusual case where there was some 
substantial error unobjected to by inadvertence or 
neglect of sounsel and where it was of such critical 
importance that it awears likely that an unjust 
conviction resulted therefrom. (Emphasis added.) 
A partial explanation for this doctrine is contained in 
State v. Smith, 16 U.2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) where this 
court said: 
He (defendant's counsel) urges the prerogative, 
which we recognize, of noticing palpable and signi-
ficant error which may have deprived an accused of 
a fair trial, under special circumstances where the 
interests of justice so require, even in the absence 
of such objections. However, we emphasize that this 
is done rarely and with caution in an awareness of 
the importance of timely and proper objections. The 
purpose of this is to call attention to rulings claimed 
to be erroneous at a time when they may be correct-
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ed; and also to guard against any deliberate with-
holding of objections with an ulterior purpose in 
mind of later taking advantage of errors committed. 
A Washington Court in State v. Payne, 25 Wash. 2d 407, 
171P.2d227 (1946) which dealt with an abortion conviction 
and the admissibility of certain photographs has stated: 
He (defendant's counsel) contends that the court 
erred in permitting photographs of gruesome objects 
to go to the jury. 
A complete answer to this assignment is that no ob-
jection was made to the admission in evidence of the 
pictures in question. In any event, the admissibility 
of pictures shown to be competent, relevant and 
material is beyond controversy. A qualification of 
the rule based upon degrees of unpleasantness would 
produce nothing but confusion in the law. 
The respondent submits that the photographs were not 
prejudicial and that if by some stretch of the imagination 
they should be construed to be so, that the degree of preju-
dice produced was not such as to cause this Court to dis-
regard the fact that counsel during trial failed to object to 
their admittance into evidence. For this additional reason, 
the appellant's attempt at appeal should fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent submits that when the probative value 
of the photographs in question is weighed against the con-
tended prejudice to the defendant, that the lower court's 
ruling as to the admissibility of the evidence must be sus-
tained, and that in any event, this Court should be precluded 
from entertaining points on appeal that were not objected 
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to in the trial court. The Respondent further submits that 
the evidence presented at the trial, with or without the 
ph:Otograp'hs in question, was more than thait needed .for the 
verdict returned and that the conviction by the lower court 
should be affirmed in all respects. 
Re~pectf ully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
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